Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Reyes

62 Phil 461 (GR No. L-43263)

October 31, 1935

J. Malcolm

Facts;

On December 13, 1933, following the enactment of Act No. 4122 or the Installment Sales Law, E.M. Reyes executed in favor of the Manila Trading & Supply Co., a chattel mortgage on an automobile as security for the payment of the sum of P400, which Reyes agreed to pay in ten equal monthly installments. As found by the trial judge, Reyes failed to pay some of the installments due on his obligation. Thereupon the Manila Trading & Supply Co., proceeded to foreclose its chattel mortgage. The mortgaged property was sold at public auction by the sheriff of the City of Manila for the sum of P200, After applying this sum, with interest, costs, and liquidated damages to Reyes' indebtedness, the latter owed the company a balance of P275.47, with interest thereon at the rate of 12 percent per annum from February 19, 1934.

When Reyes failed to pay the deficiency on the debt, the company instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery thereof. To plaintiff's complaint defendant filed an answer in which he pleaded as a defense that plaintiff, having chosen to foreclose its chattel mortgage, had no further action against defendant for the recovery of the unpaid balance owed by him to plaintiff, as provided by Act No. 4122. After trial the lower court sustained defendant's defense and rendered a judgment absolving him from the complaint, with costs.

From this judgment, the plaintiff has taken an appeal and here contends that the lower court erred in not declaring Act No. 4122 of the Philippine Legislature unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) in that it embraces more than one subject, (2) in that it unduly restrains the liberty of a person to contract with respect to his property rights, (3) in that it is class legislation, and (4) in that it denies vendors and lessors of personal property the equal protection of the laws.

Issues:

1.) Whether or not Act No. 4122 violates the constitutional provision "that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embraced more than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

2.) Whether or not the said law violates the non-impairment clause.

Held:

Act No. 4122 known as the enforcement sales law is valid and enforceable.

The Philippine Legislature having had the purpose in mind in enacting Act No. 4122 to provide legislation concerning sales on the installment plan, this subject was sufficiently expressed by indicating in the title that the law had to do with an amendment of the Civil Code in the portion thereof given to purchase and sale. Legislation should not be embarrassed by overly strict construction. The constitutional provision " that no bill which may be enacted into law shall be expressed in the title of the bill" while designed to remedy an evil was not designed to require great particularity in stating the object of the law in its title.

Parties have no vested rights in particular remedies or modes of procedure, and the Legislature may change existing remedies and modes of procedure without impairing the obligations of contracts, provided an efficacious remedy remains for the enforcement of a mortgage may not, even when public policy is invoked as an excuse, be pressed so far as to cut down the security of a mortgage without moderation or reason or in a spirit of oppression.

In the Philippines three remedies are available to the vendor who has sold personal property on the installment plan. (1) He may elect to exact fulfillment of the obligation (Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Millan [1935], 61 Phil 409). (2) If the vendee shall have failed to pay two or more installments, the vendor may cancel the sale. (3) If the vendee shall have failed to pay two or more installments, the vendor may foreclose the mortgage if one has been given on the property. Act 4122 does no more than qualify the remedy.

The question of the validity of an act is solely one of constitutional power. Questions of expediency of motive or of results are irrelevant. Nevertheless it is not improper to inquire as to the occasion for the enactment of a law.

Most constitutional issues are determined by the Court's approach to them. The proper approach should be to resolve all presumptions in favor of the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the constitution. All doubts should be resolved in its favor.

Public policy, obvious from a statute, when defined and established by legislative authority and when violative of no constitutional principle, should be perpetuated by the Courts.

Alvarez vs. The Court of First Instance

64 Phil. 33 (GR No. L-45358)

January 29, 1937

J. Imperial

Facts:

On June 3, 1936, the chief of of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board presented to Judge David, presiding judge of CFI of Tayabas, alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner is keeping in his house in Infanta, Tayabas documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law.

In his oath the chief of the secret service did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his knowledge of the facts but the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon this questioned affidavit, the judge issued the search warrant, ordering the search of the petitioners house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents and the immediate delivery of such to him (judge). With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at 7 o'clock of the night and seized and took possession of various articles belonging to the petitioner.

The petitioner asks that the warrant of issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at anytime of the day or night, of certain accounting books, documents, and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta, Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.

Issues:

1.) What is the nature of searchers and seizures as contemplated in the law?

2.) What is required of the oath in the issuance of search warrant?

3.) What is the purpose of the disposition in addition to the affidavit?

4.) Whether or not the search warrant could be serve at night?

5.) Whether or not the seizure of evidence to use in an investigation is constitutional?

6.) Whether or not there was a waiver of constitutional guarantees?

Held:

A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court (section 95, General Orders. No. 58, as amended by section 6 of Act No. 2886). Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others (In re Pacific Railways Commission, 32 Fed., 241; Interstate Commerce Commission vs Brimson, 38 Law. ed., 1047; Broyd vs. U. S., 29 Law. ed., 746; Caroll vs. U. S., 69 Law. ed., 543, 549). While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights or citizen, for the enforcement of no statue is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basis principles of government (People vs. Elias, 147 N. E., 472).

As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional right is one of the highest duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation on, the rights secured by them(State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizure or search warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed., [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U. S. 14 Fed. [2d],88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613).

Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which the constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in general language. All illegal searches and seizure are unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U. S. 75 Law. ed., 374; Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed., [2d], 881;U. S. vs. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497; Angelo vs. U. S. 70 Law, ed., 145; Lambert vs. U. S. 282 Fed., 413; U. S. vs. Bateman, 278 Fed., 231; Mason vs. Rollins, 16 Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).

Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.

Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. As we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and that the search could not legally be made at night.

The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.

At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself (Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620; Temperani vs. U. S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U. S., 116; Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S., 132). Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him.

The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion that there was no such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise and, second, because if there was a compromise it reffered but to the institution of criminal proceedings fro violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but such was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.

Stonehill vs. Diokno

20 SCRA 383 (GR No. L-19550)

June 19, 1967

CJ Concepcion

Facts:

Upon application of the prosecutors (respondent) several judges (respondent) issued on different dates a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners (Stonehill et. al.) and/or corporations of which they were officers to search the persons of the petitioner and/or premises of their officers warehouses and/or residences and to seize and take possession of the personal property which is the subject of the offense, stolen, or embezzled and proceeds of fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used or the means of committing the offense, which is described in the application as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and injunction and prayed that, pending final disposition of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the prosecutors, their agents and representatives from using the effect seized or any copies thereof, in the deportation case and that thereafter, a decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void. For being violative of the constitution and the Rules of court by: (1) not describing with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against the petitioner; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in accordance with law.

In their answer, the prosecutors (respondent) alleged; (1) search warrants are valid and issued in accordance with law; (2) defects of said warrants, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) in any event the effects are admissible regardless of the irregularity.

The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However by a resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized from the offices of the corporations.

Issues:

1.) Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to assail the legality of search warrants issued against the corporation of which they were officers.

2.) Whether or not the search warrants issued partakes the nature of a general search warrants.

3.) Whether or not the seized articles were admissible as evidence regardless of the illegality of its seizure.

Held:

I

Officers of certain corporations, from which the documents, papers, things were seized by means of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 

Officers of certain corporations can not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

II

The Constitution  provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

Search warrants issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

General search warrants  are outlawed because the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers.

To prevent the issuance of general warrants this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court  that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."

Seizure of books and records showing all business transaction of petitioners persons, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal contravened the explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized be particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major objective the elimination of general warrants.

III

Most common law jurisdiction have already given up the Moncado ruling and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.

 

The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

The Court held that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Philippine Jurisprudence Case Digest

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